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Note
UNSPOKEN ASSUMPTIONS: EXAMINING TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER
NONMEMBERS NEARLY TWO DECADES AFTER DURO V. REINA
BENJAMIN J. CORDIANO
In a series of decisions beginning in 1978 with Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, the Supreme Court has stripped Indian tribes of the ability to prosecute all
criminal offenders within the borders of their territory. A decade after holding
that non-Indians were not subject to the criminal jurisdiction of Indian tribes, the
Supreme Court, in Duro v. Reina, held that Indian tribes do not possess criminal
jurisdiction over Indians that were not members of the tribe. The decision created
a jurisdictional void: for certain types of crimes neither the federal, state, nor
tribal governments possessed the power to prosecute nonmember Indian offenders.
Congress acted quickly to rectify the jurisdictional gap caused by the Court’s
decision in Duro, passing legislation which became known as the “Duro Fix.”
The “Duro Fix” has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the double jeopardy
context, but the Court has not yet heard a case involving an equal protection or
due process challenge to the legislation. If such a challenge materializes, the law
could see a return to the reasoning used by the Duro Court.
This Note examines the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Duro and uses nearly
twenty years of anecdotal evidence, case law, and congressional findings to show
that the Court relied on flawed assumptions about the nature of nonmember
criminal jurisdiction in the modern tribal context. By examining the modern
realities of two tribes, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians
and the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, this Note concludes that
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Duro is flawed and that criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians is crucial to tribal self-governance and maintenance of
reservation life.
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UNSPOKEN ASSUMPTIONS: EXAMINING TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER
NONMEMBERS NEARLY TWO DECADES AFTER DURO V. REINA
BENJAMIN J. CORDIANO ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The newly formed United States government began entering into
treaties with the Indian nations in 1778.1 The treaties constituted
international agreements between two nations and illustrate that initially
the United States treated the Indian nations as full sovereigns.2 Fifty years
later, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court declared that
Indian tribes were not foreign nations under the Constitution, but instead
domestic dependent nations.3 In 1871, Congress enacted a statute
declaring that Indian tribes would no longer be recognized as “independent
nations” with whom the United States may contract by treaty.4 The
sovereignty of Indian tribes is not made clear in the United States
Constitution, which refers to Indian tribes only for the purpose of declaring
that Congress has the power to regulate commerce with them.5 Thus, the
status of Indian tribes within our political system has been defined over the
years by a mixture of Supreme Court jurisprudence and Congressional
action.
One aspect of sovereignty that Indian tribes have not retained is the
ability to prosecute all criminal offenders within the borders of their
territory.6 In 1978, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Supreme
Court held that non-Indians were not subject to the criminal jurisdiction of
Indian tribes.7 The Court stated that although Indian tribes retain certain
“quasi-sovereign” authority, they are prohibited from exercising powers
that are “inconsistent with their status.”8
In Duro v. Reina, decided a decade later, the Supreme Court continued
∗
Boston College, B.S. 2004; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2009. I
would like to extend my gratitude to Professor Bethany Berger for her guidance, suggestions and
encouragement throughout the writing process. I also wish to thank Mr. John Petoskey, Chief Judge
Wilson Brott, and Chief Justice Anita Dupris, whose willingness to help made this Note possible.
Finally, I thank my colleagues on the law review for all of their hard work and dedication.
1
Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13.
2
See id. (describing the agreement as between the “United States of North-America” and the
“Delaware Nation”).
3
See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (stating Indian nations may be more
correctly denominated “domestic dependent nations”).
4
25 U.S.C. § 71 (2000).
5
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
7
Id.
8
Id. at 208.
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to whittle away at tribal sovereignty, holding that Indian tribes did not
possess criminal jurisdiction over Indians who were not members of the
tribe.9 Although the decision ostensibly rested on Oliphant, it in fact
turned on concerns more applicable to an equal protection or due process
analysis, such as the characteristics of tribal justice systems and the place
of nonmember Indians within them.10 The decision created a jurisdictional
void for certain types of crimes; neither the federal government, state
government, nor the tribes possessed the power to prosecute nonmember
Indian offenders for certain types of offenses.11 Congress acted quickly to
rectify the jurisdictional gap left by the Court’s decision in Duro. Six
months after the decision, Congress enacted Public Law 101-511,
amending the definition of tribal “powers of self government” in the Indian
Civil Rights Act to include, “the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby
recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians.”12 This became known as the “Duro Fix.”13
In 2004, the Supreme Court heard the first case challenging the “Duro
Fix.”14 In United States v. Lara, the Court, in the context of a double
jeopardy challenge, upheld the Congressional power to recognize and
affirm tribal sovereignty in the context of criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians.15 Notably, the Court did not resolve whether the Due
Process or Equal Protection Clauses prohibit tribes from prosecuting a
nonmember citizen of the United States.16 If the Supreme Court hears a
case challenging the Duro Fix under either equal protection or due process
grounds, the law could see a return to the reasoning used by the Court in
Duro v. Reina. This Note examines the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Duro and argues that the Court relied on flawed assumptions about the
nature of nonmember criminal jurisdiction in the modern tribal context.
Part II of this Note sets forth the scope of criminal jurisdiction in
Indian country and examines the judicial limitations placed on tribal
criminal jurisdiction in Oliphant and Duro.17 It will also discuss the Duro
Fix and the subsequent challenge in United States v. Lara, and outline the
equal protection analysis applied to measures affecting Indian people. Part
9

Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 692 (1990).
See id. at 693–96 (discussing the “special nature” of tribal courts).
11
See id. at 697–98 (stating that its decision did not imply endorsement of the theory of a
jurisdictional void and that “if the present jurisdictional scheme proves insufficient to meet the practical
needs of reservation law enforcement, then the proper body to address the problem is Congress, which
has the ultimate authority over Indian affairs”).
12
Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b)–(c), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892–93 (1990) (codified as amended 25
U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000)).
13
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004). This Note will refer to Public Law 101-511,
amending 25 U.S.C. § 1301, as the “Duro Fix.”
14
Id.
15
Id. at 199–206.
16
Id. at 205.
17
See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000) (defining “Indian Country”).
10
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III analyzes closely the Duro Court’s assumptions regarding tribal criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, using a number of sources to show
that these assumptions are incorrect given modern realities in Indian
country. Part IV focuses this empirical lens, closely examining the
realities of nonmember criminal jurisdiction in Indian country in the
context of two tribes: the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa
Indians and the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation. This
Note concludes that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Duro does not
adequately reflect the characteristics of modern Indian tribes and that
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is crucial to tribal selfgovernance and maintenance of reservation life.
II. JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS ON CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN INDIAN
COUNTRY
A. Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country
As the Supreme Court has noted, “criminal jurisdiction over offenses
committed in Indian country is governed by a complex patchwork of
federal, state, and tribal law.”18 Whether a crime committed in Indian
country may be prosecuted by the United States, the state, or a tribe,
depends on a variety of factors.19
The Indian Country Crimes Act (“ICCA”) provides that the general
laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in
any place within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States extend to
Indian country.20 The ICCA contains two important exceptions: the
jurisdiction of the federal government does not extend to offenses
committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian,
nor does it extend to any Indian committing any offense in Indian country
who has been punished by the local law of the tribe.21 Therefore, although
the federal government has broad jurisdiction in Indian country, it
generally has no jurisdiction for crimes between Indians and may not
prosecute Indian offenders who have already been punished by the tribe.
The Indian Major Crimes Act (“MCA”) enumerates fourteen offenses
that, if committed by an Indian in Indian country, are subject to the same
laws and penalties that apply in areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction.22
18

Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 102 (1993) (citations omitted).
As will be illustrated, these may include the identities of the victim and the defendant, the
nature of the crime, and the existence of specific statutory provisions governing jurisdiction.
20
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000).
21
Id.
22
Id. § 1153 (2000) (identifying offenses covered under the statute including, among others,
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and assault with a dangerous weapon). The statute was passed in
reaction to Ex Parte Crow Dog, in which the Supreme Court held that the federal government had no
jurisdiction to try an Indian for the murder of another Indian. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556
19
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Importantly, the statute, unlike the ICCA, does not contain an exception for
crimes committed between two Indians.23 It remains an open question
whether federal jurisdiction is exclusive of tribal jurisdiction.24 Further,
the Assimilative Crimes Act compensates for the less exhaustive federal
criminal code by applying the appropriate state criminal law to cases in
which the federal government has jurisdiction, but federal statutes have not
defined the crime.25
Generally, state authority to prosecute crimes involving Indians in
Indian country is pre-empted as a matter of federal law.26 States, however,
do possess exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians
against non-Indians in Indian country.27 Congress has plenary authority to
alter these “jurisdictional guideposts,” and has done so with respect to
certain states.28 In 1953, Congress passed Public Law 280, which granted
a number of states authority to exercise general criminal jurisdiction over
Indians in Indian country and made the ICCA and MCA inapplicable in
those areas.29 However, the vast majority of Indians have never been
subject to Public Law 280. Since it was passed, the statute has been
unpopular with both states and tribes and the inadequacies of Public Law
280 have led to endemic lawlessness in many parts of Indian country.30
The Supreme Court has held that “tribes possess those aspects of
sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a
necessary result of their dependent status.”31 Therefore, tribes have the
power, by virtue of their retained inherent sovereignty, to prosecute their
own members for violations of tribal law.32 The Court has held, however,
that tribes have been divested of their inherent power to prosecute non(1883); see Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 209–12 (1973) (describing the Court’s holding in Ex
Parte Crow Dog and the Congressional response).
23
18 U.S.C. § 1153.
24
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 n.1 (1990); see Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 826 (9th Cir.
1995) (finding that tribes retain jurisdiction over crimes within the MCA but dismissing the habeas
corpus petition on the grounds that the petitioner failed to exhaust her tribal court remedies).
25
See 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2000) (stating that any person guilty of an act which, although not made
punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed within the jurisdiction of
the State, shall be guilty of like offense and like punishment).
26
Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 103 (1993).
27
United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).
28
Negonsott, 507 U.S. at 103.
29
67 Stat. 588, 588–60 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000) (mandatory states) & 25
U.S.C. § 1321 (2000) (optional states)).
30
Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California
Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1409 (1997) (examining Public Law 280 as the source of
lawlessness rather than its remedy); see Bryan H. Wildenthal, Fighting the Lone Wolf Mentality:
Twenty-First Century Reflections on the Paradoxical State of American Indian Law, 38 TULSA L. REV.
113, 129 (2002) (discussing inadequacies of Public Law 280 that have led to “endemic lawlessness” in
many parts of Indian country).
31
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
32
Id. at 326 (“[T]he sovereign power of a tribe to prosecute its members for tribal offenses clearly
does not fall within that part of sovereignty which the Indians implicitly lost by virtue of their
dependent status.”).
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Indians by virtue of their dependent status.
Indian tribes, because their sovereignty predated the formation of the
Union, are not bound by the United States Constitution.34 Although the
Bill of Rights therefore does not apply to tribal governments, the Indian
Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”) imposes similar restrictions on tribes.35 The
ICRA contains, among others, an equal protection and due process
provision, a prohibition from compelling any person in a criminal case
from being a witness against himself, a double jeopardy clause, and a
takings clause.36 Although the ICRA mirrors the Bill of Rights in many
important ways, key differences remain that are relevant in the criminal
context. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, applicable to the
federal government and later incorporated against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, requires that indigent defendants in criminal cases
have access to effective assistance of counsel at the expense of the state.37
The ICRA, although securing the right to assistance of counsel in criminal
proceedings, does so only at the defendant’s own expense.38 In addition,
the Sixth Amendment requires that defendants in criminal proceedings be
afforded an impartial jury comprised of one’s peers.39 The ICRA requires
that tribal courts provide a jury at the defendant’s request where
imprisonment is a potential punishment; however, there is no provision
concerning the jury’s impartiality or its makeup, beyond a numerical
requirement.40 The Fifth Amendment demands that no person be held to
answer for an infamous crime unless on presentment or indictment of a
grand jury.41 The ICRA contains no references to indictment by grand
jury;42 nevertheless, it should be noted that the United States Supreme
Court has not found that particular provision to be incorporated against the
33

Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208–09 (1978).
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“As separate sovereigns pre-existing
the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional
provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.”); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S.
376, 383–84 (1896) (holding that the Fifth Amendment is inapplicable to tribal actions).
35
25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000) (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall . . .
compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due
process of law.”).
36
Id.
37
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–45 (1963) (discussing
applicability of the right to counsel against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause).
38
25 U.S.C. § 1302(6).
39
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Duncan v. Louisiana 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (discussing the
right to be tried by a jury of one’s peers as an “inestimable safeguard,” and holding it applicable against
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
40
25 U.S.C. § 1302(10) (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall . . . deny
to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by
jury of not less than six persons.”).
41
U.S. CONST. amend V.
42
25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000).
34
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states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.43 The
only remedy available in federal court to enforce the ICRA is a writ of
habeas corpus, which effectively limits federal review under the Act to
criminal cases and other matters involving deprivations of personal
freedom.44
To summarize generally, tribal courts have jurisdiction only over
offenses involving an Indian offender. Further, tribes are limited by the
ICRA to imposing punishments of up to one year in prison and a fine of
$5000.45 For offenses enumerated in the MCA, the federal government has
jurisdiction even if the crime is between two Indians, and otherwise has
jurisdiction only if the crime is between an Indian and a non-Indian. Tribal
courts have no jurisdiction over non-Indian offenders, and, outside Public
Law 280 states, the state has jurisdiction only where the crime involves
two non-Indians.
B. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
In Oliphant, the Suquamish tribe sought to prosecute two non-Indian
residents of the Port Madison Reservation: Mark Oliphant, for assaulting a
tribal officer and resisting arrest, and Daniel Belgarde, arrested by tribal
authorities for reckless driving after he led tribal police officers on a highspeed race along the Reservation highways that ended only when Belgarde
collided with a tribal police vehicle.46 Both defendants applied for a writ
of habeas corpus to the United States District Court, which was denied and
later affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.47 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether tribal
courts have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.48
The Court first determined that tribes historically had not assumed
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians by treaty or custom, although the
evidence was equivocal.49 Next, the Court examined federal enactments to
determine whether Congress had recognized criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. The Court relied on an “unspoken assumption” by Congress
that tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, and expanded a
nineteenth century decision in which the court reached an “implicit
conclusion” that although Congress never expressly forbade such

43

Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534–35 (1884).
13 U.S.C. § 1303 (2000); see Carole E. Goldberg, Individual Rights and Tribal Revitalization,
35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 889, 899 n.64 and accompanying text (2003) (citing non-criminal cases in which the
habeas provision has been invoked).
45
25 U.S.C. § 1302(7).
46
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 (1978).
47
Id. at 194–95.
48
Id. at 195.
49
Id. at 197–200, 208.
44
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jurisdiction, it was a necessary result of repeated legislation. Finally, the
Court determined that the inherent sovereignty of tribes is limited not only
by treaty restrictions and congressional divestiture, but also when the
inherent sovereignty of tribes is inconsistent with their status.51 Upon
incorporation into the territory of the United States, the exercise by tribes
of separate powers was constrained where it conflicted with that of the
overriding sovereign.52 Tribes necessarily surrendered their power to try
non-Indians because of the overriding sovereign’s “great solicitude that its
citizens be protected . . . from unwarranted intrusions on their personal
liberty.”53
As Professor Bethany Berger has noted, the Oliphant Court’s decision
“created something wholly new in Indian Law, the principle that simply by
incorporation within the United States tribes had lost inherent criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.”54 Although the Court’s decision has been
vigorously criticized by scholars,55 it remains law that tribal courts have no
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.56
C. Duro v. Reina
The United States Supreme Court continued the divestiture of tribal
sovereignty begun in Oliphant with its decision in Duro v. Reina, holding
that the retained sovereignty of a tribe does not include the right to try
nonmember Indians.57 Albert Duro, an enrolled member of a band of
Cahuilla Mission Indians, is a native of California who, before 1984, lived
most of his life outside an Indian reservation.58 In 1984, he resided on the
Salt River Reservation with a female tribal member and worked for a tribal

50

Id. at 203–04 (citing In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 115–16 (1891)).
Id. at 208.
52
Id. at 209.
53
Id. at 210.
54
Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal
Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047, 1056 (2005).
55
See Russell Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609, 610 (1979) (“A close
examination of the Court’s opinion reveals a carelessness with history, logic, precedent, and statutory
construction that is not ordinarily acceptable from so august a tribunal.”); Berger, supra note 54, at
1056 (“By patching together bits and pieces of history and isolated quotes from nineteenth century
cases, and relegating contrary evidence to footnotes or ignoring it altogether, the majority created a
legal basis for denying jurisdiction out of whole cloth.”); Catherine B. Stetson, Decriminalizing Tribal
Codes: A Response to Oliphant, 9 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 51, 54 (1981) (stating that Rehnquist’s “misuse
of precedent and other authority, his failure to apply traditional canons of construction, his false
assumptions and poor arguments have served as fertile ground for criticism”).
56
See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 682 (1990) (“Under this Court’s holding in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, tribal courts have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.”) (citation
omitted).
57
Id. at 679.
58
Id.
51

274

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:265

59

construction company. As an enrolled member of another Indian tribe,
Duro was not eligible for enrollment in the Salt River Pima-Maricopa
Indian Community, the reservation’s governing tribe.60 On June 15, 1984,
Duro allegedly shot and killed a fourteen-year-old boy within the
boundaries of the reservation. The victim was a member of the Gila River
Indian Tribe of Arizona, a separate tribe occupying a separate
reservation.61 A complaint was filed in United States District Court,
charging Duro with murder and aiding and abetting murder under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2, 1111, 1153.62 Duro was arrested by federal agents in
California, but the indictment was later dismissed on the motion of the
United States Attorney.63 The tribe then took custody of Duro and charged
him with illegal firing of a weapon on the reservation, a misdemeanor
crime punishable at that time by up to six months imprisonment and a $500
fine.64 After the tribal court denied his motion to dismiss the prosecution
for lack of jurisdiction, Duro filed a petition for habeas corpus in the
United States District Court.65
The district court granted the writ, holding that any assertion of
criminal jurisdiction by the tribe over a nonmember Indian would violate
the equal protection guarantees of the ICRA; since the tribe could not
prosecute non-Indians under Oliphant, to subject a nonmember Indian to
tribal jurisdiction would constitute discrimination based on race.66 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district
court’s order, in an opinion that was later revised.67 The Ninth Circuit
found that the district court erroneously assumed that tribal courts extend
their criminal jurisdiction to Indians on the basis of race.68 Rather, the
court concluded that, “for the purpose of federal jurisdiction, Indian status
is ‘based on a totality of circumstances, including genealogy, group
identification, and lifestyle, in which no one factor is dispositive.’”69
Using this definition, the court then determined that Duro’s contacts with
the tribe, such as residing with a member on the reservation and his
59
Id. The Salt River Reservation, which occupies approximately 50,000 acres east of Scottsdale,
Arizona, was authorized by statute in 1859 and established by Executive Order in 1879. Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 679–80. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000), commonly known as the Major Crimes Act, subjects
Indians to federal jurisdiction for certain enumerated offenses. See Id. § 2 (“Whoever commits an
offense against the United States or aids, [or] abets . . . its commission, is punishable as a principal.”);
Id. § 1111 (defining murder); see also supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the Major
Crimes Act).
63
Duro, 495 U.S. at 679–80.
64
Id. at 681 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1982)).
65
Id. at 681–82.
66
Id. at 682.
67
Duro v. Reina, 821 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1987), modified, 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1988).
68
Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d at 1144.
69
Id. (quoting Robert Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 518 (1976)).
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employment with the tribe, justified tribal jurisdiction.
The court
concluded that the need for effective law enforcement on the reservation
provided a rational basis for the classification.71 The court found that its
conclusion was strengthened by the fact that a contrary holding would
create a jurisdictional void in which neither the federal government, states,
nor tribes could try nonmember Indians for misdemeanor crimes.72
Between the first and second sets of opinions from the Ninth Circuit,
the Eighth Circuit, in Greywater v. Johnson, held that tribal courts do not
possess inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.73 The
Ninth Circuit declined to follow the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning,74 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split in circuits.75
The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach and stated that the
rationale of its decisions in Oliphant and United States v. Wheeler, a case
decided sixteen days after Oliphant, compelled the conclusion that Indian
tribes lack jurisdiction over persons who are not tribe members.76 The
tribes and the United States sought to distinguish Oliphant by showing that
tribes historically asserted criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers and that
all previous congressional legislation applied to all Indians without respect
to membership in a particular tribe. The Court rejected this argument.77
Similarly, although Wheeler involved a tribal member’s double jeopardy
challenge, the Duro Court nonetheless found its analysis of inherent tribal
sovereignty persuasive.78 According to the Duro Court, following
Wheeler, the retained sovereignty of the tribes is only that needed to
control their own internal relations, and to preserve their own unique

70

Duro, 851 F.2d at 1144.
Id. at 1145.
72
Id. at 1145–46.
73
Greywater v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 486, 493 (8th Cir. 1988). In Greywater, three members of the
Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians were arrested on the Devils Lake Indian Reservation in
North Dakota and charged with possession of alcohol in a motor vehicle, public intoxication, and
disorderly conduct. Id. at 487. The defendants moved the Sioux Tribal Court to dismiss the charges
against them, maintaining that the tribal court had no criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers of the
Devils Lake Sioux Tribe. Id. After the tribal court denied the motions, the defendants filed writs of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court, which were denied pending exhaustion of the tribal
court proceedings. Id. at 487–88. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court and directed
that the writs be issued, holding that the tribe did not possess criminal jurisdiction over the defendants.
Id. at 493. Although the court acknowledged that Oliphant concerned only non-Indians, it interpreted
the Supreme Court’s analysis to compel the same conclusion as to nonmembers of the tribe, whether
Indian or not. Id. at 491.
74
Duro, 851 F.2d at 1140 n.1.
75
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 684 (1990).
76
Id. at 684–85.
77
Id. at 689. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, argued that in fact the evidence is stronger and tends
to support such jurisdiction. See id. at 703–04 n.2 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he historical record reveals that Congress and the Executive had indeed considered the question of
intertribal crime.”).
78
Id. at 685.
71
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customs and social order.
The Supreme Court did not explicitly address the equal protection
question; nevertheless, much of the majority opinion concerned whether
nonmember Indians were similarly situated to non-Indians on reservations,
and the due process concerns raised by tribal courts.80 The Court found
that for purposes of criminal jurisdiction, a nonmember’s relationship with
a tribe is the same as a non-Indian’s: Duro could not vote, hold office, or
serve on a jury under Pima-Maricopa authority. Therefore, exercising
jurisdiction over him would not fall within the powers necessary for tribal
self-governance.81
The Duro Court also focused on the “special nature” of tribal courts.82
Tribal courts, it stated, are influenced by the unique customs, languages,
and usages of the tribes they serve and their legal methods may depend on
“unspoken practices and norms.”83 Significant to the Court was the fact
that the Bill of Rights does not apply to tribal governments.84 Although the
Court recognized that the ICRA provides guarantees of fair procedure, it
found that these were not equivalent to their constitutional counterparts,
citing the right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants as an
example.85
The Court recognized that tribal members, each of whom is also a
citizen of the United States, are subject to tribal tribunals, but stated that
tribal sovereignty over members comes from the consent of its members,
and declared that in the criminal context, membership marks the bounds of
tribal authority.86 The voluntary character of tribal membership and the
right of participation in a tribal government, the authority of which rests on
consent, justified the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over tribal
members.87
Without “endors[ing] . . . the theory of a jurisdictional void” that
would arise if tribes lacked jurisdiction over minor crimes by nonmember
Indians, the Court declared that this concern was not dispositive.88 The
79
Id. at 685–86. As Professor Berger notes, this hackneyed vision of tribal communities lies at
the heart of the opinion. Berger, supra note 54, at 1062. The Court ignored the modern realities of
tribal communities in its vision of tribal governments acting only to preserve unique customs
untouched by time, despite the fact that Duro’s own situation helped illustrate these. Id. Duro,
although not a member of the tribe, lived with a tribal member on the reservation and was employed by
the tribe, and his victim was also a resident of the reservation though he was a member of a separate,
though historically related tribe. Id. at 1062–63.
80
Duro, 495 U.S. at 688, 693.
81
Id. at 688.
82
Id. at 693.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 694.
88
Id. at 697.
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Court offered several solutions for any void created by the decision. It first
noted that the MCA applies to major felonies such as the alleged murder in
Duro, then suggested tribes could exercise their “traditional and undisputed
power” to exclude persons whom they deem undesirable from their lands.89
Further, the Duro Court stated that states may, with the consent of the
tribes, assist in law enforcement on the reservation by assuming
jurisdiction through Public Law 280.90 The Court also suggested that
reciprocal agreements between tribes might operate to give separate tribal
governments jurisdiction over each other’s members.91 Lastly, the Court
stated that “if the present jurisdictional scheme proves insufficient to meet
the practical needs of reservation law enforcement, then the proper body to
address the problem is Congress, which has the ultimate authority over
Indian affairs.”92
1. The Duro Fix
The reaction in Indian country to the Supreme Court’s decision was
immediate; within ten days, the National Congress of American Indians
(“NCAI”) had convened a meeting of tribal, Bureau of Indian Affairs and
congressional representatives to discuss the implications of the case and
possible responses.93 The Deputy Director and Senior Counsel of the
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs stated that “millions of people were
calling all the time . . . . The outcry was clear and it was solid and
everybody knew we had to fix it.”94 Congress responded to the Court’s
invitation to overrule Duro; six months after the decision, Public Law 101511 was passed, amending the definition of tribal “powers of selfgovernment” in the ICRA to include “the inherent power of Indian tribes,
hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians.”95
The initial legislation was effective only until September 30, 1991.96
In the year that followed, Congress held “extensive hearings.”97 Congress
determined that nonmember Indians own homes and property, are part of
the labor force, are frequently married to tribal members, receive tribal
services, and have other close ties to tribes, and therefore it was

89

Id. at 696.
Id. at 697.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 698.
93
Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 TULSA L. REV. 5, 11
(2004).
94
Id.
95
Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b)–(c), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892–93 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
1301(2)(2000)).
96
H.R. REP. NO. 101-938, Amendment No. 314 (1990) (Conf. Rep.).
97
S. REP. NO. 102-153, at 13 (1991).
90
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appropriate to include them within the jurisdiction of tribal courts.98
Congress also concluded that the historical record supported this
jurisdiction, noting that “[u]ntil the Supreme Court ruled in the case of
Duro, tribal governments had been exercising criminal jurisdiction over all
Indian people within their reservation boundaries for well over two
hundred years.”99 On October 28, 1991, Congress made the legislation
permanent.100
2. Challenging the Duro Fix: United States v. Lara
In United States v. Lara, the Supreme Court heard the first direct
challenge to the Duro Fix: whether Congress had the constitutional power
to relax restrictions that the political branches have, over time, placed on
the exercise of a tribe’s inherent legal authority.101 Billy Jo Lara was an
enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians in
North Dakota. He was married to a member of the Spirit Lake Tribe, also
of North Dakota, and resided with his wife and children on the Spirit Lake
Reservation.102 As a result of several incidents of serious misconduct, the
Spirit Lake Tribe issued an order excluding Lara from the reservation.
After violating the order, Lara was stopped by federal officers, and he
struck one of the arresting officers.103 Lara was prosecuted by the Spirit
Lake Tribe for violence to a policeman, plead guilty and served ninety
days in prison. The federal government then charged Lara with the federal
crime of assaulting a federal police officer, the elements of which were
similar to the tribal offense.104
Lara brought a double jeopardy claim, arguing that the federal
The
government’s prosecution violated the Fifth Amendment.105
government argued that the dual sovereignty doctrine determined the
outcome of Lara’s claim. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions brought by separate
sovereigns.106 In the government’s view, the tribe was exercising its own
inherent tribal authority in prosecuting Lara, as Congress recognized and
affirmed in the Duro Fix.107 The Eight Circuit, reversing the district court,
held that the tribal court, in prosecuting Lara, was exercising federal
prosecutorial power delegated by Congress and therefore the dual
sovereignty doctrine did not apply, and the Double Jeopardy Clause barred
98

Id. at 7.
S. REP. NO. 102-168, at 2 (1991).
100
Pub. L. No. 102-137, § 1, 105 Stat. 646 (1991).
101
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004).
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 196–97.
105
Id. at 197.
106
Id. (citing Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985)).
107
Lara, 541 U.S. at 198 (2004).
99
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the second prosecution.
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Congress can
constitutionally authorize tribes, as an exercise of their inherent tribal
authority, to prosecute nonmember Indians.109 The Court found that
Congress possessed the constitutional power to lift restrictions on the
tribes’ criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians and cited several
considerations that led it to this conclusion.110 The Court noted first that
Congress has broad general powers to legislate with respect to Indian
tribes, a power the Court has consistently referred to as “plenary and
exclusive.”111 This plenary authority has been interpreted to allow
Congress to both restrict and relax restrictions placed on tribal sovereign
authority, which has historically caused major changes to the “metes and
bounds of tribal sovereignty.”112
The Lara Court also stated that it is within Congress’ power to modify
the degree of autonomy enjoyed by a dependent sovereign that is not a
state.113 Looking to prior precedent, the Court concluded that it had based
previous interpretations of inherent tribal authority upon a variety of
sources, one of which was Congressional legislation. This source was
subject to change and indeed had been changed in the wake of the Court’s
ruling in Duro.114 The Court further noted that the change at issue in the
case was a limited one and in large part concerns a tribe’s authority to
control events that occur upon the tribe’s own land.115
The Court explicitly declined to reach the merits of Lara’s due process
and equal protection claims, finding that they were not properly presented
in the context of his double jeopardy claim, and noting that other
defendants in tribal proceedings remain free to raise such claims. 116 In his
concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy noted that the case did not require the
Court to address these difficult constitutional questions; however, he
strongly suggested that the Court should resolve this issue in the future,
calling it a “most troubling proposition.”117 According to Justice Kennedy,
“the National Government seeks to subject a citizen to the criminal
jurisdiction of a third entity to be tried for conduct occurring wholly within
the territorial borders of the Nation and one of the States. This is
unprecedented.”118
108

Id.
Id. at 210.
110
Id. at 200.
111
Id.
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Id. at 202.
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Id. at 203.
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Id. at 206–07.
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Id. at 204.
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Id. at 209.
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Id. at 212–14 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Id. at 212.
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Although the Supreme Court has not resolved this particular issue, it
has given guidance on the application of the Equal Protection Clause to
federal measures classifying Indian people. Federal power to enact laws
dealing specially with Indian tribes is explicitly provided by the Indian
Commerce Clause and implicitly by the Treaty Clause.119 These measures,
and federal practice since the founding of the United States, have led to an
entire title of the U.S. Code composed of laws applicable only to Indian
tribes and their members.120 Classifications of members of Indian tribes,
moreover, do not turn primarily on race, but instead on their membership
in uniquely sovereign entities.121 Therefore, the Supreme Court has held
that federal measures classifying Indians will be upheld so long as they can
be “tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward
the Indians.”122 Although the Ninth Circuit has upheld the Duro Fix under
this standard,123 more recent statements by the Court suggest that it may
scrutinize an equal protection challenge to the Duro Fix more carefully.124
Many commentators have discussed the possible outcomes of a
challenge to the Duro Fix on both due process and equal protection
grounds.125 The outcome of such a case is not within the scope of this
119

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Indian Commerce Clause); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2
(Treaty Clause); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–52 (1974).
120
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552.
121
Id. at 553 n.24; see United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977) (stating that federal
regulation of Indian affairs is not based on impermissible classifications; “[r]ather, such regulation is
rooted in the unique status of Indians as ‘a separate people’ with their own political institutions.
Federal regulation of Indian tribes, therefore, is governance of once-sovereign political communities; it
is not to be viewed as legislation of a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’”) (citations omitted).
122
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555. The Court stated that it had “on numerous occasions . . . upheld
legislation that single[d] out Indians for particular and special treatment” and cited several examples.
Id. at 554–55; see Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S.
463, 500–01 (1979) (noting that “[i]t is settled” that the federal government may “enact legislation
singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be constitutionally offensive”); Antelope,
430 U.S. at 646–47 (applying this framework to uphold the application of federal criminal jurisdiction
to Indian defendants).
123
Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 932–33 (9th Cir. 2005).
124
See United States v. Lara 541 U.S. 193, 211–13 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing
the “troubling proposition” reached by the majority and suggesting that the government may not
subject a citizen to the criminal jurisdiction of a third entity beyond the limited extent that a member of
a tribe consents to the jurisdiction of his own tribe); Id. at 231 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Court should stand by its explanations in Oliphant and Duro and hold that Congress is without
authority to enact the Duro Fix because “Congress cannot control the interpretation of the statute in a
way that is at odds with the constitutional consequences of the tribes’ continuing dependent status”);
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 519–20 (2000) (stating that the Mancari opinion “was careful to note .
. . that the case was confined to the authority of the [Bureau of Indian Affairs], an agency described as
‘sui generis’”) (citations omitted); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243–45 n.1
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the majority’s insistence on applying the label “strict
scrutiny” to benign race-based programs will force the conclusion that “the special preferences that the
National Government has provided to Native Americans since 1834 [are] comparable to the official
discrimination against African-Americans that was prevalent for much of our history”).
125
See, e.g., Steven J. Gunn, Compacts, Confederacies, and Comity: Intertribal Enforcement of
Tribal Court Orders, 34 N.M. L. REV. 297, 318–19 (2004) (discussing possible constitutional
limitations on the ability of Indian tribes to prosecute nonmember Indians after Lara); Anna
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Note. It seems likely, however, that the Court would use such a challenge
to revisit the concerns about nonmember Indians and tribal courts that
characterized Duro v. Reina. Because these concerns relied on flawed
analysis and incorrect assumptions, it is important to review and correct
them now.
III. EXAMINING THE DURO COURT’S ASSUMPTIONS
A. Tribal Self-Government and Tribal Integrity
The Duro Court recognized that tribes can extend jurisdiction where
needed to preserve tribal integrity and self-determination, but implicitly
held that exercising criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians did not
fall within this category.126 The Court stated that for purposes of the
criminal jurisdiction at issue in Duro, nonmember Indians were similarly
situated to non-Indians.127 This reasoning is flawed and, in fact, the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers is crucial to tribal
integrity and self-determination. Both the characteristics of most tribes
today and reservation demographics belie the Court’s conclusions;
reservations often have a significant number of nonmember Indians, with
an average percentage of twelve percent.128
In addition, Congress found that nonmember Indians are closely
integrated into reservation affairs, substantially more so than are nonIndians; nonmember Indians own homes and property on reservations, are
part of the labor force on reservations, and frequently are married to tribal
members.129 Nonmembers also receive the benefits of programs and
services provided by the tribal government, such as health care services at
tribal hospitals and clinics, and their children attend tribal schools.130 A
high rate of marriage between member Indians and nonmembers is
certainly a significant factor to be considered. In a survey of 103 tribes
Sappington, Is Lara the Answer to Implicit Divestiture? A Critical Analysis of the Congressional
Delegation Exception, 7 WYO. L. REV. 149, 175–80 (2007) (discussing the Supreme Court’s
speculation that tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers may be subject to constitutional limits,
and depending on how Congress structured its delegation, tribal jurisdiction could run afoul of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses); Alex Tallchief Skibine, United States v. Lara, Indian Tribes,
and the Dialectic of Incorporation, 40 TULSA L. REV. 47, 50–51, 61–70 (2004) (“[E]xplor[ing] the
questions left unanswered by Lara: whether a tribal prosecution undertaken pursuant to the Duro Fix
denies due process and equal protection to those nonmember Indians.”); Will Trachman, Comment,
Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction After U.S. v. Lara: Answering Constitutional Challenges to the Duro Fix,
93 CAL. L. REV. 847, 851–52 (2005) (examining the proper standard of review as well as the merits of
possible equal protection and due process claims).
126
See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990) (describing certain types of jurisdiction as “vital
to the maintenance of tribal integrity and self-determination”).
127
Id.
128
S. REP. NO. 102-153, app. E at 58 (1991).
129
Id. at 7.
130
Id.
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conducted by the NCAI in 1991, eighty percent of tribes reported that
nonmember Indians were married to tribal members.131 Ninety-two
percent reported that nonmember Indians worked on their reservations and
twenty-five percent reported that nonmembers held interests in trust or
restricted Indian land on their reservations.132
It is inevitable that some portion of the nonmember Indian population
residing on reservations will commit minor crimes. Indeed, according to a
report prepared by the United States Department of Justice, the rate of
violent crime experienced by Indians was more than twice the national
average between 1992 and 2001.133 Further, although the Duro Court
characterized the jurisdiction as being over “relatively minor crimes,”134 by
far the most common type of violent victimization among Indians was
simple assault.135 Further, the assault rate among Indians was more than
twice the rate experienced by other races.136 If a tribe could not exercise
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, no sovereign would have
the power to prosecute a significant portion of reservation populations
which commit the most common violent crime occurring within
reservation borders. When compared to a 1999 Department of Justice
Report, the rate of simple assault has increased, making tribal jurisdiction
over these types of crimes even more necessary.137
B. Tribal Court Systems
The Supreme Court stated in Duro that the special nature of tribal
courts makes a focus on “consent” more appropriate. Although the Court
noted that modern tribal courts include “familiar features” of the judicial
process, it stated that they are influenced by unique customs, languages,
and usages of the tribes they serve.138 Further, the Court noted that often
tribal courts are subordinate to other branches of government.139 Although
the preservation of tradition and custom continues to be of utmost
importance to any tribe, a report prepared by the American Indian Law
Center found that tribal justice systems are predominantly Western-style,

131

S. REP. NO. 102-168, app. E at 58 (1991).
Id.
STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME, at iv (2004).
134
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696 (1990).
135
PERRY, supra note 133, at 6.
136
Id.
137
LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME 3 (1999) (noting that the rate of simple assault,
the most common type of violent crime experienced by Indian victims, was fifty-six percent).
138
Duro, 495 U.S. at 693.
139
Id.
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patterned after state and federal models.
Of the tribes responding to the
survey, seventy-eight percent had written codes defining their laws, with
many of the codes incorporating federal, state or municipal laws.141 Nearly
all of the tribal court systems have an appeals process.142 According to the
survey, although seventy-five percent of the responding tribes have some
laws based on Indian customs, such laws were primarily applied to tribal
members.143
As to the Court’s statement that tribal courts are often subordinate to
other political branches, the American Indian Law Center survey
contradicts this notion; in fact, the survey reports that very few tribal
justice systems report political interference with the work of the courts.144
C. Tribal History Concerning Jurisdiction over Nonmembers
According to the Duro Court, historical evidence regarding criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is “less clear” than the record
supporting jurisdiction over members. However, the Court felt that “on
balance” the historical record supports the view that inherent tribal
jurisdiction extends only to tribe members.145 The historical evidence
became more clear during the congressional hearings on the Duro Fix.
Professor Richard Collins stated during the hearings that “in the period
from the founding of the Republic until the latter part of the last century . .
. [t]ribes exercised authority over members of other tribes who married into
the tribe, were adopted into its families, or otherwise became part of the
tribal community voluntarily.”146 Numerous tribal leaders stated during
hearings in both the House and the Senate that tribes had historically
exercised criminal jurisdiction over members of other tribes.147
140
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW CENTER, SURVEY OF TRIBAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS AND COURTS OF
INDIAN OFFENSES 22 (2000) [hereinafter AILC Survey].
141
Id. at 15, 18.
142
Id. at 23.
143
Id. at 15, 19.
144
Id. at vii.
145
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 691 (1990).
146
The Duro Decision: Criminal Misdemeanor Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Hearing on H.R.
972 Before the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 102d Cong. 155 (1991) [hereinafter House
Hearing] (statement of Professor Richard Collins).
147
See Id. at 94 (statement of Michael T. Pablo, Chairman, Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes of the Flathead Nation) (stating that historically, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
have always exercised criminal jurisdiction over members of other tribes); id. at 102 (statement of Zane
Jackson, Chairman, Warm Springs Tribal Council) (“[Since] the Warm Springs Reservation was first
established . . . our people have exercised jurisdiction over Indians from other tribes who came to visit
or live on our reservation . . . it was always the traditional law of our people that Indians from other
tribes who came into our sovereign territory were subject to our laws.”); id. at 178 (statement of Donna
M. Christensen, Attorney General, Navajo Nation) (“The Navajo people have interacted with other
tribes from the beginning of our history. Not surprisingly, the Navajo people, like other tribes, have
always exercised what is known as criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians when necessary.”);
see also Impact of the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Duro v. Reina: Hearing on S. 962 and S. 963 Before
the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 102d Congress, pt. 2 at 36 (1991) [hereinafter Senate Hearing]
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Upon consideration of the evidence presented at the hearings,
Congress concluded that “[u]ntil the Supreme Court ruled in the Duro case,
tribal governments had been exercising criminal jurisdiction over all Indian
people within their reservation boundaries for well over two hundred
years.”148 Congress found that previous legislation with respect to Indian
tribes indicated that it had not acted to divest tribal governments of their
inherent authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians; “[i]nstead, the assumption in Congress has always been that tribal
governments do have such jurisdiction, and Federal statutes reflect this
view.”149
D. ICRA and Defendants’ Rights
Although the ICRA guarantees protections to criminal defendants in
tribal court that are, for the most part, analogous to the protections
guaranteed by the Constitution, the Duro Court stated that it was
“significant that the Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian tribal
governments.”150 The rights significant in the criminal context not
expressly protected under the ICRA are the right to appointed counsel and
to grand jury indictments.151 The right to appointed counsel for indigent
defendants is certainly an important protection under the Bill of Rights and
the Court understandably is hesitant to look past this difference between
the Constitution and the ICRA. The Court, however, does not discuss the
fact that many tribes, although not required under the ICRA, do indeed
provide a right to appointed counsel or defense advocate, or require the

(statement of Lawrence D. Wetsit, Chairman, Fort Peck Tribal Executive Board) (“The Fort Peck
Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes have historically always enjoyed jurisdiction over nonmember Indians on
our reservation.”); id. at 62 (statement of Robert Lewis, Governor, Pueblo of Zuni) (“We have
exercised jurisdiction over non-Zuni Indians for over 450 years within the legal framework of Spain,
Mexico, and the United States in a fair and impartial way.”).
148
S. REP. NO. 102-168, at 2 (1991); see H.R. REP. NO. 102-261, at 3 (1991) (Conf. Rep.) (stating
that “tribal governments have always held” the right to exercise such jurisdiction as a matter of inherent
authority).
149
S. REP. NO. 102-168, at 3 (1991). Congress also cited with approval Justice Brennan’s account
of previous federal legislation with respect to Indian tribes, as contained in his dissenting opinion,
which reached the conclusion that there was a “congressional presumption that tribes had power over
all disputes between Indians regardless of tribal membership.” Id. at 3–4.
150
Duro, 495 U.S. at 693; see supra notes 35–42 and accompanying text (discussing key
differences between the Bill of Rights and ICRA protections).
151
See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000) (enumerating specific protections). As noted earlier, the ICRA
also makes no mention of the impartiality of juries in the criminal context. Id. The Sixth Amendment
expressly guarantees an impartial jury and has been interpreted to also guarantee a right to a fair cross
section of the community. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975).
Although the ICRA does not specifically address these protections, it does include a broad guarantee
that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law or deprived of liberty or property without
due process of law. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8). It also specifies that the jury must be comprised of at least
six persons. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10).
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judge to safeguard the rights of a defendant with no legal representation.152
Certain tribes are also required by their own constitutions or by tribal
policy to provide appointed counsel to indigent defendants.153 Congress
has also specifically authorized funding for legal assistance services to
Indian tribes, which should increase the availability of appointed counsel
in tribal courts.154
The ICRA does not require that defendants be indicted by grand jury in
criminal cases. The Fifth Amendment requires an indictment by Grand
Jury for “infamous crimes,” which have been interpreted to mean any
offense punishable by imprisonment for a term of over one year.155 Since
the ICRA does not authorize punishments involving more than one year of
imprisonment, the right to a grand jury would not attach.156 Further, the
Supreme Court has held that this right has not been incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and therefore need not be
observed by the states.157 The ICRA further provides a right to habeas
corpus review after the exhaustion of tribal court remedies.158 This serves
as a significant safeguard for defendants alleging violations of basic
fairness in tribal prosecutions.159
A comprehensive empirical study of tribal court opinions involving
individual rights claims suggests that concerns regarding tribal court
treatment of rights under the ICRA are grossly overstated, if not entirely
misplaced.160 Professor Rosen concludes that:
[T]his Article’s findings counsel strongly against the
proposals advanced by some commentators and members of
Congress that federal court jurisdiction over ICRA be
expanded, or tribal court jurisdiction curtailed, because tribal
152
See AILC Survey, supra note 140, at 27 (noting that many tribal court systems provide indigent
defendants with defense attorneys or defense advocates, while others require that the judge assure the
protection of defendants’ rights).
153
House Hearing, supra note 146, at 177 (statement of Donna M. Christensen, Attorney General,
Navajo Nation); see Senate Hearing, supra note 147, at 64 (statement of Burton Hutchinson, Chairman,
Northern Arapaho Tribe of the Wind River Reservation of Wyoming) (“Public defender services are
provided to any indigent person requesting through the Wind River Legal Services.”).
154
25 U.S.C. § 3663 (2000).
155
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a) (stating that an offense must be prosecuted by an indictment if
punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 7 advisory
committee’s note 1 (“[A]ny offense punishable by imprisonment for a term of over one year is an
infamous crime.”).
156
See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (stating that tribal governments may not impose punishment greater
than imprisonment for a term of one year and a fine of $5000, or both).
157
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
158
25 U.S.C. § 1303.
159
See H.R. REP. NO. 102-61, at 6 (1991) (stating that defendants in tribal court proceedings
“[have] a remedy for violations of basic fairness which Congress imposed on tribes through a writ of
habeas corpus in federal court”).
160
Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Of
Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 582 (2000).
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courts have not responsibly interpreted ICRA . . . Tribal
courts have found significant individual protections in ICRA
even though they express the values of due process, equal
protection, and so on, in ways that reflect and support tribal
culture. This finding casts doubt on the wisdom of curtailing
the powers of the tribal courts.161
In an extensive study of cases before the Navajo courts, Professor
Berger similarly concludes that “[t]he data regarding the experience of
nonmembers in Navajo courts do not support the assumption of the United
States Supreme Court that nonmembers will be at a disadvantage in tribal
courts.”162 In fact, nonmembers prevail slightly less than half of the time
they appear before the Navajo courts, and the decisions reveal few
troubling assessments of law or fact.163 Although the Court is properly
concerned with safeguarding individual rights, empirical tribal court
evidence suggests that a broad assumption that the ICRA inadequately
protects defendants’ rights, or that tribal courts possess bias against
nonmembers, is improper.
E. Membership and Consent
The Duro Court asserts that Indians, like all other citizens, share
allegiance to the overriding sovereign, the United States; a tribe’s
additional authority comes from the consent of its members, and therefore
in the criminal sphere membership marks the bounds of tribal authority.164
The Court maintained that a nonmember like Duro was, for purposes of
criminal jurisdiction, no different than a non-Indian.165 It emphasized the
idea of consent, stating that Duro could not become a member of the
prosecuting tribe, hold office, or serve on a jury.166 However, the Court’s
assumption that nonmember Indians are similarly situated to non-Indians
in reservation communities is inconsistent with modern realities. The
NCAI survey cited by Congress found that eighty percent of responding
tribes reported marriages between members and nonmembers and over
ninety percent reported that nonmember Indians worked on their
reservations.167
In an amicus brief filed by eighteen Indian tribes in the Lara case, the
tribes stated that “[t]he story of Spirit Lake and Billy Jo Lara is typical
throughout Indian Country. Like Mr. Lara, Indians often choose to come
161

Id. at 582–83.
Berger, supra note 54, at 1094.
163
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to other tribes’ reservations and live in Indian communities.” The tribes
noted that it is common for Indians to marry members of other tribes, live
with parents who are members of other tribes, and be employed on
reservations as nonmembers. Indians who choose to move to other tribes’
reservations are entitled to receive services provided by those other tribes,
and by the federal government, to all Indians regardless of tribal
affiliation.169 Further, although nonmembers often cannot vote in tribal
elections, many tribes allow nonmember Indians to have significant
involvement in tribal affairs, including employment on tribal government
boards and commissions, as tribal police officers, or as judges in tribal
court.170
Under the Duro Fix, an “Indian” is defined as any person who would
be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under the MCA if he
were to commit one of the enumerated crimes in that section.171 Under this
definition, a person is subject to federal criminal jurisdiction as an “Indian”
only if he is (1) of Indian ancestry, and (2) is enrolled or affiliated with a
federally recognized tribe.172 Therefore, nonmember Indians that come
within the criminal jurisdiction of a tribe under the Duro Fix will be
enrolled members of some tribe, with full rights of participation in that
tribe. Through this right, all enrolled members had an opportunity to
express their view of the Duro Fix through their tribal governments at the
time Congress was considering the amendments. Congress did not find
any Indian tribe opposed to this measure.173 The fact that the tribes were
universally supportive of the Duro Fix, through their representative tribal
governments and Congressional representatives, could therefore be seen as
an approval from all tribal members.
The Court emphasized that a tribe’s authority stems from the “consent”
168
Brief on Behalf of Eighteen American Indian Tribes as Amici Curiae at 8, United States v.
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of its members and cites the fact that nonmembers may not vote in tribal
government elections as evidence that consent has not been given.174
However, there is no general requirement that sovereigns extend the voting
franchise to all persons whom they subject to criminal jurisdiction.175 Noncitizens of the United States have no entitlement to political participation
but are nevertheless subject to federal criminal jurisdiction. Perhaps more
analogous is the fact that a resident of one state who commits a crime in
another state is certainly subject to that state’s criminal jurisdiction, despite
his inability to participate in the political process in that state. To require
that all persons have voting rights in order for the government to maintain
criminal jurisdiction is inconsistent with federal and state policies and is
impractical on reservations where a nonmember has significant community
ties but may lack the ability to vote based on his membership.
F. Suggested Remedies
The Duro Court answered the argument that they were creating a
jurisdictional void by suggesting several different remedies that would be
available to tribes and the federal and state governments in the wake of
their decision.176 None of these are viable alternatives to tribal criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.
The Duro Court’s suggested
remedies are simply unworkable and not realistic.177 One suggestion
proposed by the Court was that states’ jurisdiction under Public Law 280
could be expanded, a remedy one commentator referred to as the Court’s
“most astonishing and offensive suggestion.”178 The reality is that in fact
few Indians have been subject to Public Law 280 and it has been unpopular
with both the tribes and states to which it applied.179 Since Congress
neither appropriated funds for state law enforcement in Indian country nor
made Indian lands taxable by the states, the state governments resented the
fact that they were given the duty of law enforcement but no means to pay
for it.180 Tribes also resented the fact that state jurisdiction was thrust upon
them without their consent, a further erosion of their sovereignty.181
174
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The result of these criticisms were amendments to the law requiring
tribal consent before any state could assume jurisdiction; since these
amendments were passed in 1968 there has been almost no expansion of
Public Law 280.182 To suggest that Public Law 280 jurisdiction should
now be expanded to close the jurisdictional gap created by the Duro
decision makes little sense, considering that the law’s shortcomings have
led to lawlessness in many parts of Indian country.183 Evidence received
by Congress when it was considering the Duro Fix supports this
conclusion. Tribal governments reported to Congress that even in those
states with jurisdiction under Public Law 280, state law enforcement
officers refused to exercise jurisdiction over criminal misdemeanors
committed by Indians against Indians on reservation lands.184 In fact,
several states with large Indian populations enacted measures calling on
Congress to make the initial Duro Fix legislation permanent.185
The Court also noted that federal statutes could be construed to grant
the federal government jurisdiction over misdemeanor crimes between
Indians.186 Even if the statute were formally amended to expand federal
jurisdiction, a further intrusion of tribal sovereignty contrary to
longstanding federal policy, evidence suggests that this would prove
unworkable. As Congress recognized, the “[c]rowded dockets of U.S.
District Courts do not lend themselves to being ‘traffic court’ for this
category of Indian reservation cases.”187 The vast areas encompassed by
some reservations would make it difficult and expensive to transport
defendants, victims, witnesses and law enforcement officers to handle the
arraignments, trials and sentences required in the prosecution of such
crimes.188 According to the Senate Report, in the wake of the Duro
decision, tribal governments called upon federal and state law enforcement
authorities to assist them in assuring that offenders of federal law would be
prosecuted.189 However, reports soon came to Congress that United States
Attorneys, “overburdened with the prosecution of major crimes, could not
182
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assume the caseload of criminal misdemeanors referred from tribal courts
for prosecution of nonmember Indians.”190 Even as to major crimes, for
which the federal government has long had jurisdiction, the declination
rate remains unsatisfactory to a majority of tribes.191 According to
Congress, less than forty-three percent of all referrals were prosecuted in
1988 and less than forty percent of all referrals were prosecuted in 1989.192
More recent data confirms this finding. A 2007 study published by
The Denver Post determined that the overall declination rate by the federal
government for reservation cases is just over sixty-two percent.193 A six
month investigation of twenty reservations by the newspaper revealed
startling instances where serious reservation crimes go unpunished, putting
residents at risk.194 The report found that United States Attorneys and FBI
investigators face huge challenges fighting crime on reservations; they are
often viewed as outsiders and the remote locations and high levels of
alcohol use by witnesses make prosecutions difficult.195 The high
declination rate is in part due to the fact that (1) federal prosecutors want to
prosecute more high profile cases, such as major drug or white collar crime
cases, and (2) federal prosecutors want to bring cases with a high
likelihood of success.196 In other instances it is not simply a lack of will
that is the problem, but a question of numbers. On the Blackfeet
Reservation, for example, there are only three federal agents assigned to
investigate felony crimes, with each juggling up to fifty cases.197 One
190
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United States Attorney noted that the lack of investigation of low-priority
felonies erodes faith in justice on reservations just as much as would
ignoring murders.198 In light of the current problems with felony
investigations and prosecutions, the Court’s suggestion that federal
jurisdiction be expanded is a dangerous idea and should not be considered
a viable option.
Another measure suggested by the Court is to banish undesirable
persons from reservation lands.199 As one commentator has noted, “such a
solution is both repugnant and unworkable.”200 With the high rate of
intermarriage between tribal members and nonmembers, the exclusion of
nonmembers from the reservation—thus, perhaps dividing families—
would be more of an intrusion upon essential liberties than criminal
prosecution.201 Further, as the Lara case illustrates, the exclusion power is
not a practical way to preserve order among those who live on the
reservation; the incident which brought Lara before the court arose out of
attempts to enforce an exclusion order against him.202 In the NCAI survey
relied on by Congress, eighty-nine percent of responding tribes stated that
excluding nonmember Indians was not a workable solution.203 The most
frequently cited reasons were extensive intermarriage between members
and nonmembers, the large presence of nonmember children and
nonmember employment on the reservation.204
The Duro opinion also suggests that tribal governments could form
reciprocal agreements to grant jurisdiction over one another’s members.205
However, the Court does not address the fact that there would be a
tremendous amount of practical difficulties involved with attempting to
make enforceable agreements between over five hundred federally
recognized tribes.
After suggesting these various remedies in a portion of the opinion that
seems like more of an afterthought by the Court, it stated that “[i]f the
present jurisdictional scheme proves insufficient to meet the practical
needs of reservation law enforcement, then the proper body to address the
problem is Congress, which has ultimate authority over Indian affairs.”206
Of course, Congress did just that when it enacted the Duro Fix within six
months of the Court’s decision, but the significance of the anecdotal
evidence received by Congress in the intervening period should not be
198
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overlooked. The jurisdictional void stressed by the tribes and predicted by
the Ninth Circuit became a reality. As the House Report stated, “[t]he
Committee was inundated with anecdotal accounts describing serious
jurisdictional law and order problems resulting from the Court's holding.
Nonmember Indian perpetrators on reservations could no longer be taken
to the most accessible forums. Remote reservations with high rates of
intermarriage with other tribes were facing chaos.”207 Congress received a
large amount of testimony from tribes across the country facing serious
problems as a result of the Court’s decision.208 For example, the Yakima
Indian Nation reported that it was forced to dismiss pending charges
against forty-three Indians because they were not formally enrolled
members of the tribe.209 The Suquamish Indian Tribe testified that six
cases had to be dismissed after the Court’s decision in Duro, and that it
was unable to prosecute at least twelve other incidents.210 The U.S.
Attorney for the District of South Dakota and Chair of the U.S. Attorney’s
Indian Affairs Subcommittee testified that the Duro decision created a
sudden deprivation of long and widely-exercised jurisdiction causing a
serious law enforcement problem in Indian country.211 He stated that the
“the jurisdictional gap is real and adversely affects the tribe’s ability to
protect reservation residents from violations of the law.”212
The Duro Court’s conclusions, and the assumptions it relied on in
reaching its conclusions, must be reexamined if the Court is faced with a
due process or equal protection challenge to the Duro Fix. Practical
realities involving law enforcement problems faced by many tribes in the
wake of the Court’s decision should not be ignored, nor should the
demographic realities of modern tribal communities. Nonmember Indians
make up a significant portion of many reservations and are often integrated
into the community through family and employment, making the Court’s
focus of “consent” and voting rights appear misplaced. The alternatives
suggested by the Court are, quite simply, unrealistic and unworkable.
Evidence presented to Congress following the Court’s decision clearly
illustrates this. Criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is crucial to
the maintenance of tribal self-government and the regulation of tribal
integrity, and must be recognized as such.
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IV. AN EXAMINATION OF TWO TRIBES
Nearly twenty years after the Court’s decision in Duro, changing
conditions and demographics in Indian country further illustrate the
inaccuracy of many of the Court’s assumptions. In order to analyze
critically the applicability of the Court’s reasoning to today’s tribal
communities, it is necessary to examine conditions “on the ground” in
Indian country today. The significant number of Indian tribes in both
Michigan and Washington make a study of the Grand Traverse Band of
Ottawa and Chippewa Indians and the Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Reservation particularly insightful when examining nonmember criminal
jurisdiction.
A. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians
A historical question often asked of ethnologists who study Indian
cultures is “[w]hich tribe lived in this area when white people first
arrived?”213 This question, however, is more properly a question of nonIndian history, as the very concept of “tribe” as it is used today had little
meaning to native peoples before they had extensive contact with nonIndian settlers.214 In Michigan, where the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa
and Chippewa Indians is located, the native people living there prior to
contact with European settlers would have identified themselves
collectively as “Anishnabeg,” meaning “original man.”215 Beyond this, a
native of this area would most likely have identified with a clan on the
basis of his father’s lineage, then with a particular band, a small local
economic and sociopolitical group.216
The Ottawa and Chippewa bands migrated from the Atlantic seaboard
and in the sixteenth century formed the loosely-organized Three Fires
Confederacy along with the Potawatomi.217 They referred to themselves
collectively as the Anishnabeg, spoke similar dialects of the Algonquin
language, and shared many cultural beliefs and practices, including a clan
system.218 In 1836, the Treaty of Washington brought the largest cession
of land to the federal government by Michigan Indians and led to statehood
213
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for Michigan.
The treaty also created the artificial Ottawa and
Chippewa Tribe, since the two bands had agreed to act in concert for treaty
purposes.220 Currently, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa
Indians is located across a six county service area in northwest Michigan221
and has a membership total of approximately 4000 individuals.222
The Grand Traverse Band’s court system stems from Article V of its
Constitution, which vests the judicial power in a tribal court system
composed of a court of general jurisdiction and an appellate court.223 The
Constitution also contains a Judicial Independence clause, providing that
“[t]he Tribal Judiciary shall be independent from the legislative and
executive functions of the tribal government and no person exercising
powers of the legislative or executive functions of government shall
exercise powers properly belonging to the judicial branch of
government.”224 This is inapposite to the Court’s assumption in Duro that
tribal courts are often subordinate to other political branches,225 and
consistent with the American Indian Law Center Survey which found little
interference with the court systems by other branches of tribal
governments.226
The Grand Traverse Band has an extensive criminal code of laws,227
which is inconsistent with the Court’s assumption in Duro that tribes often
depend on “unspoken practices and norms.”228 Criminal jurisdiction is
codified to extend to members of the Grand Traverse Band and all other
Indians present within the territory of the Band.229 “Indian” is defined in
the code to include a member of the Band, a member of any federallyrecognized Indian tribe, band, or group, or a person of Indian blood who is
generally considered to be American Indian by the Grand Traverse Band
community.230 This is inconsistent with the Court’s presumption in Duro
that a nonmember Indian is similarly situated to a non-Indian for purposes
of criminal jurisdiction.231 Here, tribal jurisdiction will extend only to
219
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those who are enrolled in a federally-recognized tribe, or have integrated
themselves in the Band’s community such that he or she is recognized as
an Indian by the community.
Although specific statistics regarding the number of nonmembers
living within the Band’s territory are not kept by the tribe, the General
Counsel of the tribe, John Petoskey, estimated that there are a significant
number.232 Mr. Petoskey stated that there are nonmembers who reside in
public housing on the central reservation and that many are married to
members.233 Specifically, there has traditionally been a high rate of
intermarriage between members of the Ottawa and the Saginaw Chippewa
Indian Tribes, due in large part to the federal allotment policy. During the
federal government’s policy of allotment, as land in traditional “Ottawa
country” became largely occupied, the federal government allowed
members to take trust allotments in traditional “Saginaw country,” which is
located southeast of the Band’s current six county area.234 As a result,
many members of the Grand Traverse Band have ancestral ties to both
tribes, and may be eligible for enrollment in either tribe.235 Mr. Petoskey
estimated that as many as a dozen individuals who grew up enrolled in the
Grand Traverse Band, have dis-enrolled and enrolled in the Saginaw
Chippewa Indian Tribe. This could be due in part to the higher per capita
distribution from casino revenues individuals receive as members of the
Saginaw Chippewa Indian tribe. However, these individuals remain living
on Grand Traverse Band land, as they always have, and are deeply
involved in the community.236 Nonmembers are eligible for tribal
employment and can serve on tribal committees; although they cannot
vote, they can and do attend tribal council meetings and have an
opportunity to speak at those meetings.237
Wilson D. Brott, Chief Judge of the Grand Traverse Band Tribal
Court, estimates that roughly ten percent or less of the criminal cases
before the court involve nonmember Indians.238 Many of these cases
involve members of the Little Traverse Bay Band of Odawa Indians or
members of the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe. Chief Judge Brott noted
that there are many inter-tribal relationships and cautioned against the idea
that there are “walls” between different Michigan tribes.239 This is
consistent with the historical development of Michigan’s tribes, who, as
232
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discussed above, traditionally did not primarily identify themselves as
members of specific tribes but as Anishnabeg.240 Chief Judge Brott also
noted that many of the nonmember Indians appearing before the court are
married to Grand Traverse Band members, and it is not uncommon for a
family to have members of the Grand Traverse Band as well as members
of other tribes.241 Although nonmembers cannot vote in tribal elections,
Chief Judge Brott pointed out that there are many ways that an individual
can be involved in the community outside of the voting franchise. Like
Mr. Petoskey, Chief Judge Brott noted that nonmembers can be employed
by the tribe and although they cannot vote for the tribal council, they
regularly attend meetings and have a voice that would be heard.242
Nonmembers also get the benefits of tribal services, including health care,
and often are raising children who attend tribal schools and are eligible for
enrollment, if not formally enrolled. Chief Judge Brott acknowledged that
in some instances there are cases of nonmember Indians who come to the
reservation temporarily and do not have extensive ties to the community,
but this is a rarer occurrence.243
A cross-deputization agreement between the Grand Traverse Band and
the state and county sheriff’s department was reached in 1990 and is an
important law enforcement tool for the tribe.244 The agreement removes
the jurisdictional question for purposes of arrest; an offender can be
arrested by the state, county, or tribe and is brought to the county jail
where he or she will be referred to the proper prosecutorial body once his
or her status is determined.245
Although nonmember Indians cannot serve on Grand Traverse Band
tribal court juries, Chief Judge Brott estimated that out of approximately
300–400 criminal cases before the court, which includes traffic cases, there
have been only one or two jury trials in the previous four years.246 Plea
agreements are reached in some cases and for those that go to trial, the vast
majority are conducted as bench trials. Although all criminal defendants
have a right to a jury trial, this right is often waived prior to the
commencement of trial.247 The tribe does not provide counsel to indigent
defendants, although Chief Judge Brott stated that in cases involving a pro
se defendant, judges will assist defendants if necessary. This assistance
could involve further explanation before and during trial to assure that the
240

See WEEKS, supra note 215, at 2–3 (discussing the region prior to the arrival of European

settlers).
241

Telephone Interview with Wilson D. Brott, supra note 170.
Id.
243
Id.
244
Telephone Interview with John Petoskey, supra note 232.
245
Id.
246
Telephone Interview with Wilson D. Brott, supra note 170.
247
Id.
242

2008]

UNSPOKEN ASSUMPTIONS

297

defendant knows his rights and understands the legal process. During
bench trials, judges can give the appropriate weight to hearsay evidence, or
other evidence that may have been admitted without an objection from a
pro se defendant, for example.248 Chief Judge Brott, who also has served
as a prosecutor for the local state court in Leelanau County, stated that
there are no major differences between the manner in which the tribal court
conducts trials and the way they are conducted in the state court.249
Importantly, even if a certain tribal court operated with different procedure,
the major protections are the same. All tribal courts are required to follow
the ICRA and all adhere to basic principles of justice such as having a fair
trial and an ability to be heard.250
Although the Grand Traverse Band does not publish its tribal court
cases and therefore no specific opinions could be researched, Mr.
Petoskey, who has been the Band’s General Counsel for some twenty
years, recalled two cases in the intervening period between the Supreme
Court’s decision in Duro and the Duro Fix.251 The court chose to exercise
jurisdiction over the defendant, and in neither case was the issue
challenged by the defendant. Mr. Petoskey believed that this was most
likely due to the fact that the nonmember defendants involved had been a
part of the tribal community and would not object to the court’s
jurisdiction.252 One of these instances involved a nonmember living in the
Grand Traverse community and married to a member of the Band; he was
arrested and prosecuted for an assault that arose out of a fight at a card
game.253 This type of scenario exemplifies the need for tribal court
jurisdiction over nonmembers for the preservation of law and order and
tribal self-government. What could be seen as a relatively minor crime
still must be prosecuted in order to maintain a safe community. According
to Chief Judge Brott, based on his previous experience as a defense
attorney, most nonmember Indians would prefer to be prosecuted in tribal
court rather than state court.254 As previously stated, many are integrated
into the tribal community and therefore the jury is truly composed of their
“peers” despite the fact that nonmembers cannot serve on juries.255
If the Duro Fix were to be struck down, Mr. Petoskey believed the
effect would be more drastic than it was in 1990 due to the fact that there is
a larger population of nonmember Indians residing in Grand Traverse Band
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country.
Both Mr. Petoskey and Chief Judge Brott stated that if this
occurred, the tribe would be forced to increase its reliance on federal
In many previous instances, however, the federal
prosecution.257
government has been unable to prosecute crimes occurring on the
reservation for a variety of reasons.258 The federal court is also over two
hundred miles away, and therefore for practical reasons it would most
likely be difficult for the federal government to prosecute a large number
of misdemeanor crimes occurring on the reservation.259 Exclusion orders
are not a viable option in Chief Judge Brott’s view; although the tribe has
that option, it is very reluctant to exercise it since most often the individual
would be integrated with the tribe through marriage and may have children
living on the reservation and attending tribal schools. Further, as a
practical matter, exclusion orders are very difficult to enforce.260
B. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation
The Colville Reservation was established by Executive Order in 1872
and originally spanned over 2.8 million acres.261 Today the reservation
land base covers 1.4 million acres located in North Central Washington
and the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation has membership
totaling over nine thousand.262 Today’s members are the descendants of
twelve aboriginal tribes of Indians who resided throughout the Northwest
and were largely nomadic, traveling with the seasons and their sources of
food.263 The Confederated Tribes are a northerly component of an
“Interior Salish” grouping that shared a common language called
“Okanagan,” although there were several different dialects.264 The Colville
and other tribes intermarried with adjacent peoples, but this differed among
the various divisions.265 For current Confederated Tribes members this
means that they could have ancestral ties to several Northwest tribes, both
256
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within and outside of the twelve tribes comprising the Confederated
Tribes. This further illustrates the idea that tribal membership is not as
static as the Court implied in Duro, and in fact involves intertribal
relationships spanning many generations.
The Confederated Tribes’ court system stems from its Constitution,
which establishes a judicial branch, separate from the other branches of
government, consisting of a tribal court and a court of appeals.266
Although the Confederated Tribes’ Constitution does not contain a
“judicial independence” clause similar to that found in the Grand Traverse
Constitution, the judiciary is not subordinate to the Business Council, the
governing body of the Tribes, but a separate branch of government.267
The Confederated Tribes have a comprehensive Law and Order Code,
with titles ranging from Rules of Procedure to Natural Resources and the
Environment.268 The criminal jurisdiction of the Tribes is codified and
includes all crimes committed by any Indian within the boundaries of the
Colville Reservation.269 “Indian” is defined as “a person who is recognized
by an Indian Tribe as a member of that Tribe or is a descendant of such
member.”270 The structure of the tribal court system, as well as the
comprehensive code provisions, are inconsistent with the Duro Court’s
assumptions that tribal courts are subordinate to other branches of
government and have laws that depend on unspoken practices and norms
rather than written codes.271
In Stead v. Colville Confederated Tribes, the Colville Court of Appeals
was presented with unique issues concerning tribal court criminal
jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian following Duro.272 Michael Stead
was a member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe but had resided on the Colville
Reservation for ten years prior to his arrest for the misdemeanor offense of
driving without a valid driver’s license.273 Stead was cited by tribal police
on August 2, 1991, and arraigned on August 12, at which point he was
assigned a public defender. In a pre-trial motion filed on the day of the
trial, Stead moved the court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Stead
argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over him as a nonmember, based
on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Duro and the recent expiration of Public
266
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Law 101-511, the initial Duro Fix.
His motion was denied and he was
brought to trial, convicted, and sentenced to a sixty day suspended
sentence and three hundred dollar fine. On appeal, Stead argued
essentially that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial in light
of his status as a nonmember Indian.275
The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court, holding that the Duro Fix
was a recognition of the inherent jurisdiction of tribal courts over
nonmember Indians that has always existed and continued uninterrupted
despite the Duro decision.276 The Appellate Court cited approvingly
Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion, stating that the notion of tribal
authority to control the conduct of tribal members based on consent is
inconsistent with federal and state policies.277 The Appellate Court further
concluded that the jurisdictional void created by the Court’s decision in
Duro renders its reasoning suspect, and that the Duro Fix was enacted in
response to an emergency situation in Indian country as a result of the
Duro decision.278 The Appellate Court also noted the significance of
Congress’ recognition of the past federal practice of settling more than one
tribe on a single reservation, and the fact that although nonmember Indians
are not allowed to fully participate in all aspects of the tribal government,
they are provided with a broad array of services by the tribe.279
The Stead decision illustrates that the Duro Court’s assumption that
non-Indians and nonmember Indians are similarly situated is simply
erroneous. Stead’s situation is similar to the defendants in both Duro and
Lara, as well as Congressional findings during hearings on the Duro Fix:
Stead had resided on the reservation for a decade and was an enrolled
member of a federally recognized tribe.280 The notion that his rights as a
citizen were being violated by the prosecution is misplaced; the tribe was
exercising jurisdiction to maintain the safety of its residents on its
roadways by prosecuting a member of a federally recognized tribe who
chose to reside on the Colville Reservation for ten years. Stead was
granted his rights under the ICRA and was also appointed with a tribal
public defender, further calling into question the Duro Court’s broad
assumptions regarding procedural protections in Indian country.281 This
type of offense also highlights the need for tribal jurisdiction, since
although driving without a license is a misdemeanor and can easily be
274
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characterized as a minor crime, it is crucial to the maintenance of the
health and safety of reservation residents that the roadways be policed
effectively.
Another case arising on the Colville Reservation, cited in the sixmonth Denver Post investigation, underscores the likely inadequacy of
federal jurisdiction if the Duro Fix were struck down.282 In that case, the
federal government declined to prosecute a tribal member who raped his
girlfriend’s seven-year-old sister.283 Although the tribe’s prosecutor stated
that an expert forensic interviewer found the seven-year-old’s testimony
clear and credible, the Assistant United States Attorney, faced with a
geographically distant case and a seven-year-old witness, simply declined
to prosecute.284 The tribe’s prosecutor successfully obtained a conviction
in tribal court under misdemeanor charges;285 however, if the federal
government cannot effectively exercise its current jurisdiction under the
MCA, it is dangerous to assume that expanding that jurisdiction to cover
misdemeanor offenses is a viable remedy were the Supreme Court to strike
down the Duro Fix.
Anita Dupris, Chief Justice of the Colville Confederated Tribes Court
of Appeals since 1995, estimates that approximately half of the
reservation’s ten thousand residents are either nonmember Indians or nonIndians.286 Although the tribe does not keep specific statistics as to how
many nonmember Indians reside on the reservation, if consistent with the
average cited by Congress, the reservation could be home to upwards of
one thousand nonmember Indians, a significant number.287 Many
nonmembers living on the Colville Reservation are there through
intermarriage, and under the tradition and custom of the tribe, when an
individual from another tribe marries a tribal member, he or she becomes a
part of the tribe’s community and is treated as such.288 Chief Justice
Dupris believes that exercising criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians is crucial to tribal self-government and tribal integrity.289 This
jurisdiction leads back to the basic idea of sovereignty and is a
foundational building block of any society. A society must be able to
monitor the laws and these laws must be enforceable in order to be a
sovereign government; the Court’s decision in Duro further eroded tribal
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sovereignty and was inconsistent with basic notions of Indian law.
According to Chief Justice Dupris, the Supreme Court’s conclusion
that tribes had not traditionally exercised criminal jurisdiction over
nonmembers is “patently false.”291 The Confederated Tribes have always
exercised this type of jurisdiction, as was reflected in the Appellate Court’s
decision in Stead.292 Although prior to the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934 many tribes may not have had western-style courts, this jurisdiction
in some form has always been an aspect of tribal sovereignty.293 As to the
use of unspoken practices and norms referred to in Duro, the Confederated
Tribes’ traditions and customs have been codified into its extensive
criminal code. In this sense, it can be compared to a state’s incorporation
of its common law into its criminal code.294
As referenced in Stead, the Confederated Tribes has maintained a
public defender’s office since 1993.295 This is common throughout all
tribes in Washington; although in some instances a lay advocate or public
defender can be appointed, generally defendants in tribal courts will have
assistance of counsel.296 Chief Justice Dupris does not believe that any of
the Duro Court’s suggested remedies are viable alternatives if the Duro Fix
were struck down.297 Although the Colville Tribal Courts have good
working relationships with the state, the state would have tremendous
practical difficulties taking over the ten thousand cases heard annually by
tribal courts.298 Federal jurisdiction is hardly more desirable. As
previously discussed, even in situations where the federal government has
jurisdiction under the MCA, such jurisdiction is not often exercised.299
According to figures published in the Denver Post study, the overall
federal declination rate in Washington was over fifty-five percent for
felony crimes between 2004 and the first nine months of 2007.300 Chief
Justice Dupris believed that many of these cases were declined either
because federal prosecutors want only “sure-bets,” or the cases were not
290
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given a high enough priority.
As to the Duro Court’s suggestion of
exclusion, even if this were a desirable alternative for the tribe in a certain
situation, these orders are very difficult to enforce.302
V. CONCLUSION
If faced with a challenge to the Duro Fix on either equal protection or
due process grounds, the Supreme Court should reexamine its decision in
Duro in light of nearly twenty years of anecdotal evidence, case law and
congressional findings illustrating that its assumptions were incorrect and
its reasoning flawed. The problems faced by tribes in the wake of the
Court’s decision in Duro, as well as the continuing law enforcement
problems tribes face on today’s reservations cannot be ignored. It has been
demonstrated that the Court’s historical findings were inaccurate, and that
tribes exercised criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers for over two
hundred years. With high rates of intermarriage and historically complex
interrelationships between tribes, membership in a particular tribe is not as
static as the Court suggests in Duro. As demonstrated by the Grand
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, many of today’s
reservation residents have ancestral and historical ties to more than one
tribe. Therefore, it is commonplace that those residing on a reservation
may not be members of the presiding tribe. Tribes’ ability to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers is crucial to the maintenance of
self-government and tribal integrity, as nonmembers residing on
reservations are most often integrated into the reservation community.
Tribal governments must be able to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
nonmembers committing crimes that would otherwise go unprosecuted if
left to federal or state authorities. Although misdemeanor crimes do not
often garner headlines, reducing these types of crimes is crucial for the
maintenance of a safe community and therefore integral for effective tribal
self-government.
The remedies suggested by the Duro Court were either unrealistic or
unworkable and cannot be reasonably relied on as alternatives to the Duro
Fix. Modern tribal characteristics and demographics, combined with the
continuing law enforcement challenges faced by tribes today, make
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians an important aspect of tribal
sovereignty that must be unambiguously recognized by the Supreme Court.
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